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In order to control agency problem, several corporate governance mechanisms 
have been invented and used. However, the intensity of the usage of the 
mechanisms, such as board or directors and external auditing is different 
among companies. The focus of this research is on external monitoring which 
has substituting effect for monitoring by the board. The research investigates 
into the relationship between the ownership structure and external monitoring 
and finds moderating influence on the relationship. The paper examines 1,078 
firms listed in the Korea Stock Exchange in the manufacturing industry for the 
period between 2003 and 2013 to empirically test the hypotheses on ownership 
structure and external monitoring. The results shows concentration of 
ownership has negative association with external monitoring while foreign 
ownership and group affiliation are associated positively. It was also found that 
concentration of ownership strengthened the relationship between foreign and 
group affiliation and external monitoring. The research demonstrates that 
different incentive and ability each firm possesses have effects on the 
behavior to adjust agency cost.
   ………………………………………
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Proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency theory has received a 
great deal of spotlight from corporate governance literature. Agency 
cost is a combination of various costs that arises from separation of 
ownership and control as the managers, i.e. the agents, who have been 
bestowed with some decision making authority to delegate the owners, 
i.e. principals. The misaligned interests and information asymmetry had 
the principals bear the costs from the separation of ownership and 
control. Shareholders have devised internal and external corporate 
governance measures to monitor and control the agents. What 
determines the monitoring of managers’ behavior is the vigilance of 
non-manger shareholders and other related stakeholders (Ang, Cole, and 
Lin, 2000). 
Naturally, there lies a dilemma between bearing expenses arising from 
misaligned interest between manager and owner and incurring 
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monitoring cost in order to offset information asymmetry. Then who 
decides to generate monitoring cost in order to minimize other costs 
constituting agency cost?
In order to examine the question, it is reasonable to look the 
characteristics of the principals, since monitoring costs are generated 
by principals. In such context, this paper investigates the monitoring 
incentives and abilities of the shareholders and shows how different 
incentive and ability of the shareholders affect the governance of a 
firm. Specifically, the research addresses the relationship between the 
concentration of ownership and external monitoring and moderating role 
of ownership and firm characteristics.
Monitoring and controlling the management is one of the main roles of 
the board of the directors. Nevertheless each board has different 
incentives and abilities to monitor and control accordingly to the board 
composition (Hillman & Dalziel 2003) which results in different 
monitoring outcomes. When the incentives of the board members are 
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aligned to that of shareholders, the board is more likely to monitor 
more intensely (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
The shareholder’s incentive (the amount of their investment) and 
monitoring ability (type of ownership) therefore will affect the intensity 
of internal and external monitoring (Kaplan and Minton 1994).
Amongst various apparatus to monitor the managerial activity is 
external auditing, as opposed to internal monitoring (e.g. corporate 
governance and concentration of ownership). Since external monitoring 
can substitute for internal monitoring (Rediker & Seth, 1995), 
shareholders who do not find internal monitoring by the board 
sufficient will seek for external monitoring instead. 
The degree of external monitoring will be measured by audit fee 
charged for external auditing service provided by the auditors each 
fiscal year. Audit fee has been a widely used proxy to measure the 
quality of external auditing (O’Sullivan 2000; Hay et al. 2008).
This paper aspires to examine the differing external monitoring 
behavior accordingly to the firm’s ownership structure. The paper 
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inspects how incentive to monitor and ability to internally monitor 
determined by the characteristics of ownership structure affect the 
external monitoring behavior. The paper hypothesize that concentration 
of ownership will negatively affect external monitoring while foreign 
ownership and group affiliated management are positively associated 
with external monitoring. Then the research further looks at the 
moderating effect of concentration of ownership on the relationship 
between ownership characteristics of a firm and external monitoring 
behavior. In order to conduct the research, the paper uses random 
effects longitudinal cross-sectional regression model to analyze 1,078 
listed firms in the manufacturing industry which operated from 2003 to 
2013. 
The results confirmed that firm with more concentrated ownership 
spends less on external monitoring than the firms with dispersed 
ownership and firms with higher foreign ownership spent more expense 
on external monitoring. In addition, business group affiliation was 
positively associated with external monitoring. The results also showed 
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that ownership concentration had moderating effect on the relationship 
between foreign ownership and business group association.
2. Theory
Agency problem and monitoring
Agency cost, which arises from the separation of ownership and control 
and largely stems from differing interest and information asymmetry, as 
explained by Jesen and Meckeling (1976), is one of the most popular 
research topics to be researched. Agency cost comprises of largely 
three types of costs that arises from separation of ownership and 
control: 1) Monitoring cost, 2) bonding cost (cost that comes from 
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aligning agent’s interest with that of the principals by providing 
several incentives), and 3) residual cost (the amount of wealth not 
captured by the principal due to misaligned interest) (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976).
Shareholders have sought to monitor and control the agents (i.e. 
managers) who are given certain authorities to control the 
management. Amongst several roles of the board of directors—mainly 
composed of members inside and outside of the firm—is the monitoring 
activity; the board of directors are motivated to protect the shareholder 
rights.
There are several internal and external mechanisms to mitigate the 
agency problems such as threat of takeover or efficient labor market, 
monitoring by outside shareholders and the board of directors, and 
management share ownership (Jensen & Mecking 1976; Demsetz & 
Lehn 1985; Rediker & Seth 1995). A regulatory auditing service 
functions as an external monitoring that can substitute for internal 
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governance mechanisms (Watts & Zimmerman, 1983; Rediker& Seth 
1995)
The vigilance of board of directors is a widely studied area (Adams et 
al., 2010; Johnson et al., 1996). And there has been extensive research 
on board of director’s effectiveness of monitoring role has been 
widely discussed (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Ryan & Wiggins, 
2004). The more independent a board is the better shareholders’ 
interests are reflected (Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner, 1997). Carcello 
et al. (2002) found more independent, expertise, and diligent board 
spend more audit fee in order for protection of reputation capital and 
shareholder interests. However, the board serves other purposes and is 
not bound to monitoring role; board have cooperative relationship with 
the management and acts as advisor while it also monitor the 
management unless it is a dual board system (Adams and Ferreira, 
2007). Hence, it makes it difficult to observe the pure monitoring 
function of board of the director.
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Therefore, assuming the substitution effect of external monitoring 
(Rediker & Seth, 1995; Desender et al., 2013), the research focuses on 
external monitoring aside from other internal monitoring mechanisms.
The shareholder vigilance
Vigilant shareholders who may or may not have been appropriately 
represented in the board may affect the board to spend more on 
external monitoring.
Ownership structure matters—who owns and how much they own—as to 
different shareholders have different incentives and ability to monitor 
and control the management. Intuitively, higher incentive to monitoring 
is expected be associated with stronger vigilance and therefore result 
in higher inclination towards extensive external auditing service.
However the incentive to monitor and control will be moderated by the 
ability to monitor as well (Desender et al., 2013) since board may fail 
to perform its expected monitoring function because independent 
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directors have not been sufficiently represented (Hambrick & 
Finkelstein, 1995).
When the ownership structure is dispersed, it could be assumed there 
lies information asymmetry between the management and outsiders can 
be large and thus having external shareholders to rely more to external 
auditing whereas large shareholders (Aguilera, 2005; Desender et al. 
2013).
However it could be regarded that dispersed ownership will incur less 
incentive to monitor as shareholders possess small stake and can more 
effectively control their risk and return individually by investing in 
portfolio and nonetheless lacks ability to effectively monitor the 
management in the first place. On the contrary, controlling 
shareholders do not rely relatively much on the board (Bohinc and 
Bainbridge, 2001).
There has been a growing literature highlighting the relationship 
between ownership structure and residual loss. Externally controlled and 
managerial controlled firms have different governance processes and 
- 10 -
management remuneration system (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1995). 
Control of ownership and performance has been widely researched 
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Morck et al., 1988; McConneli and Servaes, 
1990).  These researches gives implication that control systems 
according to ownership structure affects the residual loss that 
constitutes agency cost to the owners. 
Yet there has been lack of investigation on the effects of ownership 
structure on the degree of monitoring (Desender et al., 2013).
This the paper aims to shed light on the ownership structure’s 
influence on external monitoring in the hopes of understanding the 
incentives and abilities to monitor according to the shareholders.
Monitoring and external auditing service
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Audit fee has been a well-researched proxy that represents the audit 
quality in accountings literature. Simunic (1980)’s seminal research 
theoretically approached the pricing of audit service and argued that 
audit fee is a combination of several factors that determine the audit 
quality, such as audit time. Carcello et al. (2002) used audit fee to 
measure external monitoring quality.
A stream of research has studied the implication of audit fee in the 
context of external auditing service as a corporate governance measure 
(O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al., 2002). 
The regulatory characteristics of auditing that it is mandatory for 
certain level of firms to receive external audit may be questionable, 
however there has been bountiful research regarding the determinants 
of audit fee and especially on the relationship between ownership 
structure and audit fee in accountings field (Lee & Kim, 2005; Kim et 
al., 2010; Park, 2012; Kim & Kim, 2012). Nevertheless, it is regarded 
that approach to link audit fee with corporate governance has been 
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Different types of ownership structure are to have different 
preferences of monitoring the management. The higher the 
shareholders’ incentives and the lesser the ability, the vigilance is 
expected to be higher and reliance to external monitoring will be 
maximized.
It is expected that large owners have higher incentives as their stake 
is relatively higher since large shareholders have more incentives to 
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prevent residual loss. However it could be intuitively considered that 
large shareholders have ability to do monitor via board and other 
internal monitoring mechanism, thus have less reliance on external 
monitoring. Therefore, the paper assumes that concentrated ownership 
is associated with less extensive external monitoring.
Hypothesis 1a: Firm with more concentrated ownership structure will be 
associated with lower external monitoring.
Foreign ownership
Foreign investors are not normally represented as a board member in 
Korean context. Rather, it could be assumed that strong presence of 
foreign investors may increase external monitoring in order to 
substitute for their lack of representation on the board. Since 
shareholders cannot internally or directly monitor and control the 
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management it could be predicted that they have lower level of 
internal monitoring ability.
For example, 20 percent of the total share of KPX Chemical is owned 
by foreign corporation and foreign institutional investor, who are not 
represented in the board of the directors.  It indicates that one fifth of 
the shareholders do not have ability to directly monitor the 
management. Another example is Hyundai Elevator. The largest five 
shareholders controls about 78 percent of the total share and the 
largest shareholder Schindler Deutschland Holding holds 35 percent of 
the total share. Again, Deutschland Holdings is not represented on the 
board of directors of Hyundai Elevator; it therefore has to rely greatly 
on the external monitoring.
Also, it could be assumed they also have incentive to monitor in order 
to control for uncertainties due to lack of information. The research 
consequently hypothesizes: the stronger representation of foreign 
investors, the higher external monitoring.
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Hypothesis 1b: Higher foreign ownership will be associated with higher 
external monitoring.
Group affiliation
One of the firm characteristics that many Korean firms have is 
chaebol, a unique from business group. Granovetter (1995) defines 
business groups as “collections of firms bound together in some formal 
and/or informal ways, characterized by an 'intermediate' level of 
binding (p. 96).” Business groups have personal and operational 
relationship and chaebol therefore can be classified as a form of 
business group (Granovetter, 1995; Chang, 2003). Chaebol stem from a 
single family or allied family and resources shifts within the group 
cohesively and the family owns and manages at the same time 
(Granovetter, 1995). Ownership wise, these group affiliated companies 
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are held directly or indirectly by an individual or family tied together 
through pyramid and cross-shareholding (Chang, 2003, Granovetter, 
1995; La Porta et al. 1999). Group affiliated companies, although legally 
independent from the parent company, operate like a division under 
the parent company and are controlled by the group head quarter and 
have advantage of having choice to resort to internal resourcing 
(Chang & Hong, 2000).
Parent companies desire to control the affiliated companies more 
tightly.  Since the affiliated companies are legally separate entity from 
the parent company, the parent company aspires to strengthen the 
control of their affiliated companies by tightly monitoring each affiliated 
company. 
Hypothesis 1c: group association will be associated with higher external 
monitoring
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Moderating effects of concentration of ownership
While different types of ownership and firm characteristics have 
different objectives and exert demands for monitoring (Desender et al., 
2013), it is expected that the degree of concentration will moderate the 
relationship between ownership and firm characteristics and external 
monitoring. The research hypothesizes about the impact of 
concentration on the relationship between foreign ownership and group 
affiliation and external auditing.
The paper previously expected that high proportion of foreign owners 
will be associated with higher monitoring cost. While having weak 
representation on the board low ability to directly monitor the 
management, foreign owners will have higher distrust in the 
management when the concentration level is high. Therefore, foreign 
owners who have little ability to monitor directly will have higher 
incentive will as well. Thus, the vigilance of foreign shareholders will 
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be higher and spend more external monitoring when the ownership is 
more concentrated. 
Hypothesis 2a: When the ownership is concentrated and foreign 
ownership ratio is high, the relationship between foreign ownership and 
external monitoring will be strengthened.
In the case of group affiliation, there are some cases when ownership 
is fairly diffused and cases when ownership is strongly concentrated. 
When ownership is concentrated to the parent company, the parent 
company will be less motivated to incur cost to externally monitor the 
affiliated companies since they will have tighter direct control of the 
company. These firms will have influence on the affiliated companies 
through such devices as internal resourcing and strong monitoring 
(Chang & Hong, 2000). Therefore, the paper examines whether 
concentration of ownership moderate the relationship between group 
affiliation and external monitoring.
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Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between group affiliation and external 
monitoring will be weakened when the ownership is more concentrated.
4. Methodology
Data
This research examines 1,078 listed companies in the manufacturing 
industry classified by KCIS-9 code to test the hypotheses. The data was 
collected for 11 fiscal years from 2003 to 2013. The audit fee data and 
the board data was drawn from TS-2000 presented by the Korea Listed 
Companies Association and were manually cross-checked individually 
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with the annual reports reported by each company. Concentration and 
foreign ownership variable and all of the control variables were drawn 
from Korea Information Service (KIS) database. Group affiliation data 
was coded as dummy variable based on business groups reported at the 
Fair Trade Commission’s web page. The firms which the audit fee 
data and ownership data could not be extracted from the annual 
reports were excluded from the sample.
Variables
Dependent variable
Total audit fee: The dependent variable to measure the extent of 
external monitoring is total audit fee spent in each fiscal year from 
2003 to 2013. Following previous literature that studies audit fee, the 
research used natural log of the audit fee in the models.
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Independent variables
Concentration: The study aggregates all of the shares owned by the 5 
largest shareholders reported. It is widely considered that a firm is 
concentrated when the largest shareholder owns more than 20% of the 
total share of the firm (LaPorta, Lopez de Silances, and Shleifer, 1999).
Foreign ownership: This research measured foreign shareholder as the 
total amount of share owned by foreign investors over total shares 
issued by the firm, averaged throughout the fiscal year.
Group affiliation:  The research defines business groups as “a group 
of companies, more than 30% of whose shares are owned by some 
individuals or by companies controlled by those individual,(Chang & 
Hong, 2000, p437-438)” as regulated by Korea's Monopoly Regulation 
and Fair Trade Act. The research considers a firm as a group affiliated 
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company if the company is listed in the list provided by the Fair Trade 
Commission.
Control variables
The research included number of control variables that may determine 
the audit fee. The control variables were all collected for the previous 
fiscal year before the reporting since the audit fee will be determined 
by such risk and size elements (O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al. 2002). 
Risk factors of the firm affect the audit fee since auditors charge 
higher fees to when the risk is higher (Choi et al., 2010). Risks were 
measured by the inventory and accounts receivables over total asset 
(Carcello et al., 2002). The research also included liquidity of the firm 
as another risk variable that determines the audit fee and when the 
firm has high liquidity, the risk will be lower thus the audit fee will be 
lower (Choi et al. 2010). Big 4 auditor implies audit quality difference 
and premium on audit fee (Choi et al., 2010; Simunic, 1980) therefore, 
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Dependent variable
Audit  Natural log of audit fee
Independent variables
Concentration
 The percentage of total amounts of the   largest 5 
shareholders
Foreign 
ownership  Foreign ownership percentage
Group 
affiliation  1 if a chaebol company; 0 otherwise
Control variables
Size  Total asset.
Big 4 Auditor
 1 if Deloitte Anjin, Samil PwC, Ernst &   Young Hanyoung 
or Samjong KPMG; 0 other wise
Risk  ((inventory + receivable)/total asset) of   the previous year
Liquidity  (current asset/current liabilities) of the   previous year
whether the firm received audit service from the largest four 
accounting firms (SamJeong KPMG, Samil PwC, Deloitte Anjin, Hanyoung 
Earnst & Young) was controlled in the research. Total asset was also 
included to control for the size of the firm. Sales was also included in 
the research to control for the size of the firm. 
Table 1. Description of Variables
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Models
For hypotheses testing, the research used random-effects 
cross-sectional longitudinal regression method.
The research conducted Hausman specification test to determine 
between fixed-effects model and random-effects model and the test 
result suggested fixed-effects model. Nonetheless, fixed-effects 
estimators cannot be computed in presence of time-invariant variable 
(a variable that does not change over time) because time invariant 
variables may be perfectly collinear with the fixed-effects of the group 
and therefore hinder the estimation of fixed-effect estimator (Green, 
2012). Since one of the independent variables of interest – business 
group affiliation – is a time-invariant variable, it may not be 
appropriate to use a fixed-effects model for this analysis. In other 
words, ‘Group affiliation’ variable can have perfect collinearity issue 
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      for × for
    
with the estimated fixed-effect for each firm and prevent from 
computing the fixed-effect estimator. 
The models that were used in the research to test the hypotheses 
were developed based on prior literature that analyzed pricing of audit 
service (Simunic, 1980; O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al. 2002; Park 
2010).
Model 1 (With only the control variables)
       
Model 2 (For hypothesis 1)
     for 
    
Model 3 (for hypothesis 2, with interaction term)
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      × 
    
5. Results
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and the correlations between 
the variables. It shows that firms paid audit fee around 86,056,130 won 
in average. Firm that spent the least amount of audit fee spent as 
little as 10,000,000 won and the firm that has spent the largest amount 
spent as much as 5,300 million won. Regarding the ownership structure, 
the average of the total share of the largest 5 shareholders is 48.73% 
- 27 -
of the total share. Roughly 6.7% of the total share is held by foreign 
shareholders and 9.5% of the firms in the sample are affiliated in 
business groups. 
The average sales of a firm is 571 billion won while the average total 
asset is 539 billion won. Inventory and receivables take up as much as 
24.5% of the total assets on the average. It also showed that 48% of 
the companies contracted with big 4 auditors. 
Regarding the correlations coefficients between audit fee and the 
independent variables, concentration and foreign shows expected signs. 
However, unlike the expectation that group affiliated companies and 
audit fee would be negatively correlated, the correlation coefficient 
shows positive sign.
The paper further analyzed collinearity to check multicollinearity issue 
and the variance inflation factor (VIF) showed the values were all 






Total Asset 1.24 0.808088
Foreign 1.2 0.829997





Table 3 discusses the results from the regression analysis. Model 1 
shows the result from ordinary least squared regression model. Model 2 
shows the model that includes only the control variables. The results 
show that big 4, risk, and total asset are positively related with audit 
fee and liquidity is negatively associated with audit fee. 
Model 3 tests hypothesis 1a, b, and c. The random effects model that 
tests for the hypothesis 1a, which predicts a negative association 
between concentration rate and audit fee is moderately supported. The 
fixed-effects model also supports the hypothesis. It is confirmed that, 
as the results show, company spends less on external monitoring when 
the ownership is more concentrated.
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Table 3. Regression Results
Model 1
FE RE FE RE FE RE
Concentration -0.0762 ** -0.1051 ** -0.0967 ** -0.1398 *** -0.1026 **
(0.0380) (0.0438) (0.0398) (0.0505) (0.0460)
Foreign 1.2540 *** 0.1961 *** 0.4916 *** -0.2494 0.2013
(0.0581) (-0.0693) (0.0627) (0.1777) (0.1712)
Chaebol 0.7260 *** - 0.8975 *** - 1.0625 ***
(0.0197) - (0.0419) - (0.0783)
0.9420 *** 0.5952 *
(0.3478) (0.3329)
-0.2926 ** -0.3376 **
(0.1502) (0.1380)
Big4 0.2287 *** 0.1340 *** 0.1603 *** 0.1513 *** 0.1683 *** 0.1509 *** 0.1680 ***
(0.0116) (0.0089) (0.0088) (0.0109) (0.0103) (0.0109) (0.0103)
Risk 0.5590 *** 0.4353 *** 0.4584 *** 0.3776 *** 0.4148 *** 0.3764 *** 0.4140 ***
(0.0226) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0195) (0.0188) 0(.0194) (0.0188)
Total Asset 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Liquidity -0.0226 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0000 *** -0.0031 * -0.0063 *** -0.0030 *** -0.007 *
(0.0019) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Constants 10.7419 *** 10.8562 *** 10.8138 *** 10.9554 *** 10.7819 *** 10.9866 *** 10.7848 ***
(0.0204) (0.0063) (0.0144) (0.0223) (0.0238) (0.0248) (0.0259)
N 6308 9391 9391 6308 6308 6308 6308
Standard errors in parantheses








Model 2 Model 4
Controls H 1 H 2
OLS
The random effects model that tests hypotheses 1b, also strongly 
supports the hypothesis that foreign ownership is positively associated. 
The outcome of the fixed effects model is consistent with the random 
effects model. Hypotheses 1c expected positive association between 
group affiliation and external monitoring cost.  Hypotheses 1c that 
- 31 -
group affiliated companies spend more external monitoring cost was 
tested to be significant and supported.
Model 4 tests for the moderating effect of ownership concentration on 
foreign ownership and group affiliation as hypothesized in hypotheses 2 
a and b. 
The interaction term of concentration and foreign from the regression 
result of Hypothesis 2a shows positive coefficient which is statistically 
significant. The result supports Hypothesis 2a that when the firm is 
concentrated with high foreign ownership, the relationship between the 
foreign ownership of the firm and external monitoring will be 
strengthened. Hypothesis 2b proved statistically significant and negative 
as hypothesized. The result of Hypothesis 1c and 2b together can be 
interpreted; while group affiliation alone show positive association with  
external monitoring, concentration of ownership reverses the positive 
association to negative relationship.
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Table 4. Regression Results (Sales to control size)
FE RE FE RE
Independent Variables
Concentration -0.1089*** -0.1018 ** -0.1395 *** -0.1022 **
(0.0440) (0.0400) (0.0507) (0.0462)
Foreign 0.1816 *** 0.4749 *** -0.2741 ** 0.1751
(0.0695) (0.0630) (0.1783) (0.1719)
Chaebol - 0.9158 *** - 1.1126 ***
(0.0423) (0.0785)
0.9627 *** 0.6133 *
(0.3491) (0.3342)
-0.3490 *** -0.4054 ***
(0.1506) (0.1384)
Control Variables
Big4 0.1509 *** 0.1679 *** 0.1505 *** 0.1675 ***
(0.0109) (0.0104) (0.0109) (0.0104)
Risk 0.3750 *** 0.4110 *** 0.3739 *** 0.4103 ***
(0.0195) (0.0189) (0.0195) (0.0189)
Sales 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Liquidity -0.0031 ** -0.0063 *** -0.0030 * -0.0063 ***
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016)
Constants 10.9614 *** 10.7863 *** 10.9936 *** 10.7868 ***
(0.0224) -0.0239 (0.0249) (0.0260)
N 6299 6299 6299 6299
Standard errors in parantheses
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Model 3 Model 4







The paper attempted to contribute to the literature on agency theory 
and especially on the comprehensive understanding of agency costs and 
firm behavior on the subject matter. The research shed light on the 
firm’s behavior of monitoring by examining the monitoring ability and 
incentive to control determined by the ownership characteristics. Withal, 
the research leaves room for further development for the future 
studies.
First of all, the paper only looked at the direct relationship between 
the shareholder vigilance and external monitoring. However, the 
vigilance of board should not be neglected. Board characteristics such 
as CEO duality, board externality, and size can be considered in the 
following study in order to complete a more integrated study of 
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms.
- 34 -
Furthermore, the research had a rough definition of concentration of 
ownership in the research design. However, the research design could 
be more developed by investigating into the pyramid and cross holding 
structure and identifying the controlling shareholder and the type of 
the controlling shareholder (La porta et al., 1999; Desender et al., 
2013).
7. Conclusion
The research, in attempt to find evidence on the influence of 
shareholder vigilance in terms of their incentives and ability, analyzed 
the relationship between ownership structure and external monitoring 
measured by audit fee. Following a stream of research on external 
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monitoring, external monitoring was measured as the amount of audit 
fee paid to the accounting firm. The research conducted 
random-effects longitudinal cross-sectional regression on a research 
sample of 1,078 listed firm in manufacturing industry over a time 
frame of 11 years from 2003 to 2013. The research confirmed negative 
influence of concentration of ownership on the level of external 
monitoring while foreign ownership and group affiliation showed positive 
association with external monitoring. The research further examined the 
moderating effect of concentration of ownership on the relationship 
between foreign ownership and business group affiliation and external 
monitoring.
The analyses contributed in confirming the influence of incentive and 
ability to monitor determined by the ownership characteristics and firm 
characteristics on external monitoring.
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논 문 초 록 
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주주의 경계심과 외부 감시의 역할
대리인 문제를 통제하기 위하여서는 다양한 기업 지배구조 메커니즘이 
사용된다. 하지만 이사회나 외부 감사와 같은 그러한 기업 지배구조 메
커니즘이 사용되는 정도는 기업의 특성에 따라 능력과 동기가 다르므로 
다른 양상을 보일 것이다. 본 연구는 기업 소유구조와 외부 감시 간의 
관계를 알아본 것으로서, 기업 활동 감시 기능을 갖는 이사회의 역할을 
대신하는 외부 감시에 초점을 맞춰 가설을 세우고 그것을 검증하였다. 
본 연구는 2003년부터 2013년까지 한국거래소에 상장된 1,078개의 제조
업 기업들의 경우를 대상으로 기업 소유구조와 외부 감시의 관계에 대
한 가설을 검증한다. 실증연구의 결과에 따르면 외부 감시는 기업 소유
의 집중도와 음의 상관관계를 보였고 외국인 지분이나 그룹 계열 소속
과는 양의 상관관계를 보인 것으로 나타났다. 더불어, 소유의 집중도를 
조절 변수로 사용해서 외부 감시와 외국인 지분이나 그룹 계열 소속 사
이의 관계를 조절해본 경우 소유가 집중되어 있을수록 외국인 지분과 
외부 감시 사이의 관계는 더 강해졌고 그룹 계열 소속 변수와 외부 감
시 사이의 관계도 더 강해졌다. 본 연구는 경영활동 감시를 위한 능력
과 동기가 기업마다 다르다는 보여주었다는 데에 의의가 있다.  
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